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UID:10000579-1620820800-1620826200@ccpr.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:"A Signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh\," Erica Field\, Duke University
DESCRIPTION:Erica Field\, Duke University\nSeminar Co-Sponsor: Luskin Public Policy \nAbstract: Child marriage remains common in many settings even where schooling and\nlabor market opportunities have grown considerably. To explain this phenomenon\,\nwe introduce a marriage market signaling model in which bride type is not per-\nfectly observed but preferred brides have lower benefits of delaying marriage.\nThis gives preferred brides an incentive to reveal their type by marrying young\,\nshifting the market towards early marriage even when everyone benefits from\ndelay. In this setting\, a small incentive that shifts preferred brides towards later\nmarriage can delay marriage of all types through spillovers. We test this predic-\ntion by evaluating the impact of a financial incentive to delay marriage among\n15\,576 adolescent girls in Bangladesh. Consistent with the theory\, girls eligible\nfor the incentive for two years were 21% less likely to marry before 18\, and\ngirls who were ineligible for the incentive but lived near treatment communities\nalso delayed marriage. \nA recording of Dr. Field’s presentation may be accessed here. \n 
URL:https://ccpr.ucla.edu/event/erica-field-duke-university/
CATEGORIES:CCPR Seminar,Divisional Publish
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ccpr.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/efield.jpg
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