BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//California Center for Population Research - ECPv6.15.14//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://ccpr.ucla.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for California Center for Population Research
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Los_Angeles
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20230312T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20231105T090000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20240310T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20241103T090000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0800
TZOFFSETTO:-0700
TZNAME:PDT
DTSTART:20250309T100000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0700
TZOFFSETTO:-0800
TZNAME:PST
DTSTART:20251102T090000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240403T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20240403T131500
DTSTAMP:20260504T063619
CREATED:20230929T001014Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240326T181018Z
UID:10000827-1712145600-1712150100@ccpr.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Rebecca Dizon-Ross\, University of Chicago\, "Mechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise"
DESCRIPTION:Biography:\nRebecca Dizon-Ross is a development economist and applied microeconomist with an interest in human capital. Much of her current work is on the demand side\, aiming to understand the determinants of households’ investments in health and education and to evaluate interventions to increase investment. Rebecca is an Associate Professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Before joining Booth\, Dizon-Ross was a Prize Fellow in Economics\, History\, and Politics at Harvard University and a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She received a Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University and a B.A. (summa cum laude) from Harvard University. \nMechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise\nAbstract:\nPersonalizing policies can theoretically increase their effectiveness. However\, personalization is difficult when individual types are unobservable and the preferences of policymakers and individuals are not aligned\, which could cause individuals to misreport their type. Mechanism design offers a strategy to overcome this issue: offer a menu of policy choices and make it incentive-compatible for participants to choose the “right” variant. Using a field experiment that personalized incentives for exercise among 6\,800 adults with diabetes and hypertension in urban India\, we show that personalizing with an incentive-compatible choice menu substantially improves program performance\, increasing the treatment effect of incentives on exercise by 80% without increasing program costs relative to a one-size-fits-all benchmark. Personalizing with mechanism design also performs well relative to another potential strategy for personalization: assigning policy variants based on observables.
URL:https://ccpr.ucla.edu/event/rebecca-dizon-ross-university-of-chicago/
LOCATION:4240A Public Affairs Bldg
CATEGORIES:CCPR Seminar
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR