“Beyond LATE: Economic Choices and the Identification of Multiple Treatment Effects “
Abstract: “Monotonicity” refers to a condition in choice models with instrumental variables in which a local variation of an instrument shifts all agents toward or against a choice. This paper presents a useful framework to investigate the role of monotonicity in the identification of causal effects in multiple choice models with categorical instrumental variables. I first examine a new monotonicity condition that applies to unordered choice models with multiple treatments. Like its analogous property in the binary choice model, I show that unordered monotonicity imply and is implied by additive separability in observables and unobservables in choice equations. I show that unordered monotonicity may arise from preference properties of choice behavior. I then exemplify the use of preference properties to identify causal effects in choice models where monotonicity does not hold. I show that identification and equivalence results flow from simple properties of binary matrices.
If you are interested in meeting with or joining the speaker for lunch, please send email to Seminars@ccpr.ucla.edu
12:00 pm – 1:30 pm: Seminar
1:30 pm – 2:30 pm: Proseminar Lunch: